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Abstract
The article presents a dataset on the legislative procedure in European Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and a new method
of data processing. The dataset contains information on 529 procedures proposed between January 1998 and December
2017. For each of the legislative proposals, the dataset identifies themain elements of the legislative procedure (e.g., dates,
types of procedure, directory codes and subcodes, actors, voting results, amendments, legal basis, etc.) and the changes
introduced at each step of the legislative process from the text proposed by the European Commission to the final version
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. This information has been gathered using text mining techniques.
The dataset is relevant for a broad range of research questions regarding the EU decision‐making process in JHA related to
the balance of powers between European institutional actors and their capacity to influence the legislative outputs.
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1. Introduction
How do EU institutional actors participate in and exer‐
cise influence on the law‐making process? How did
formal rule changes introduced by the successive EU
treaties modify the capacity of institutional actors to
determine legislative outputs? The academic literature
answered these questions usingmainly twomethodolog‐
ical approaches. On the one hand, inspired by rational
choice institutionalism, most studies used spatial mod‐
els to understand how actors’ preferences are trans‐
formed into decision outcomes. On the other hand, con‐
structivist approaches to the EUdecision‐making process
focused on single or comparative case studies. However,
both methodological approaches bear important limita‐
tions for the understanding of the actual distribution of
power in the EU decision‐making process. This article
presents a new research agenda to study the balance of
power between EU institutional actors in the context of
law‐making procedures, by presenting a dataset on the
legislative procedure in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
and introducing a new text‐mining method.
JHA has been often regarded as a specific EU pol‐
icy field in the EU decision‐making process due to its
intergovernmental origins and to the longstanding dis‐
putes between Member States on institutional matters,
which kept this policy field out of the traditional ‘regula‐
tory’ mode of EU policymaking for a long time. However,
starting with the Amsterdam Treaty, successive reforms
of EU formal rules normalised the decision‐making pro‐
cess in this field. Because of the evolution of the basic
legal framework, but also because of the actors’ conflict‐
ing perceptions in terms of substantive law, the area
of JHA offers an ideal test case for assessing the role
of institutional actors and their influence on the legisla‐
tive outputs. The role of the European Parliament (EP) in
JHA issues has increased significantly over time. When
the third intergovernmental pillar was introduced by the
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Maastricht Treaty, the Council of the European Union
(hereafter referred simply as the Council) enjoyed a
quasi‐monopoly on decision‐making and the EP had only
a consultative role through its right to issue non‐binding
opinions. The EP was excluded from exerting any sort
of influence on the legislative output (Crombez, 1996;
Ripoll Servent, 2018a; Steunenberg, 1994). With the pro‐
gressive communitarisation of JHA issues and the gener‐
alisation of the ordinary legislative procedure between
2005 and 2009, the role of the EP increased to the
point that it now enjoys equal legislative rights with the
Council. Consultation of the EP still applies for the adop‐
tion of measures on administrative cooperation in the
fields of policing and criminal law and unanimity has
been retained for issues relating to passports, family
law, the European public prosecutor (with the EP hav‐
ing a power of consent) and operational police coopera‐
tion. Despite those specificities, the generalisation of the
ordinary legislative procedure could reasonably be inter‐
preted as the EP exerting an influence equal to that of
the Council on the legislative outputs.
However, the academic literature offers contrasting
findings when it comes to assessing the impact of rule
change on the capacity of institutions to determine the
legislative outputs. On the one hand, spatial models suf‐
fer from a misinterpretation and misrepresentation of
the EU legislative procedures (Crombez & Vangerven,
2014). Due to the equivocal nature of formal rules, the
relative power of the Council, the European Commission
and the EP has been an element of intense debate, even
among scholars adopting very similar theoretical and
methodological approaches (Thomson & Hosli, 2006).
For example, while most formal studies argued that the
power of the EP increased with the generalisation of
the co‐decision procedure (Mcelroy, 2006; Steunenberg,
2000; Thomson, 2011), some scholars claimed that the
legislature has been weakened by this constitutional
change because the EP has lost its ability to act as a con‐
ditional agenda setter (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000). In addi‐
tion, formal models are based on a close reading of the
EU treaties to precisely specify the hypothesised policy
process or formof the game. They view institutional envi‐
ronments as static and institutional preferences as stable.
Or research has shown that institutional arrangements
are inherently dynamic, and actors might not behave
according to the formal rules (Kleine, 2013). They engage
in informal practices to avoid deadlock situations (Farrell
& Héritier, 2003). On the other hand, case studies on the
JHA proposals suggest that the formal empowerment of
the EP did not materialise in practice, because formal
rule changes did not result in substantive policy change
(Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2015). After the generalisa‐
tion of the co‐decision procedure, the EP, which has been
known for its extreme positions, tended to bemoremod‐
erate and to favour positions at the centre of the polit‐
ical spectrum (Ripoll Servent, 2018). Contrary to what
has been suggested by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), the
influence of the EP on legislative outputs is limited and
the Council still dominates the legislative procedure and
policy positionsmade jointly bymember states generally
matter more than the policy positions of the EP (Laloux
& Delreux, 2018; Thomson, 2011).
To overcome these different and sometimes contra‐
dictory findings, there is a need to connect case studies
focusing only on a few salient JHA proposals to the wider
literature on the role and influence of EU institutional
actors in each type of legislative procedure, overcoming
the fragmentation and overspecialisation of studies of
the EU individual policy areas. The dataset presented in
this article contains information on the degree of change
JHA proposals undergo during the legislative procedure.
It is innovative as it examines the role of the main institu‐
tional actors in determining the legislative output, while
capturing the specificities of a particular EU policy field.
First, the dataset maps the whole law‐making process
in JHA and the actors involved. Second, it identifies the
changes JHA proposals undergo at each step of the leg‐
islative process from the text proposed by the European
Commission to the final version published in the Official
Journal of the EuropeanUnion. Since the dataset includes
information on the legislative process in JHA from 1998
to 2017, it can be placed in the broader context of the
impact of formal rule change on substantive democratic
governance in the EU. Indeed, the time frame starts with
the Treaty of Amsterdam, which marked an important
steppingstone for the EP by shifting some of the third pil‐
lar measures (immigration, asylum, border controls, visa
and civil law cooperation, with the exception of family
law) to the first pillar and subjecting them to co‐decision;
the time span ends in 2017, seven years after the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which confirmed the EP
as a full co‐legislator in JHA. Subsequently, the article
introduces an innovative method to study the EU leg‐
islative procedure. Though this study is not the first to
apply text mining techniques to the EU decision‐making
process (see, among others, Casas et al., 2020; Cross &
Hermansson, 2017; Gava et al., 2020), its contribution
to this developing literature is two‐fold. First, it is the
first study to apply this method to all actors involved in
the law‐making process and at all stages of it. Second,
unlike other studies, it follows the open data movement
and data is made publicly available. Such a method com‐
bines flexibility with accuracy and replicability and offers
a more fine‐grained measure of legislative change than
the number of amendments or the number of words
changed. The next section describes the dataset. The arti‐
cle then presents a new research agenda on the balance
of power in JHA by discussing several research questions
that can be answered using the dataset and illustrate
them with some examples. The final section addresses
the limitations of the dataset.
2. The Dataset
This section offers a description of the dataset developed
in the framework of the AFSJ‐Pol‐Lex‐Track research
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project and of the methodology used to assemble it.
The dataset contains two types of information: (1) quan‐
titative information related to each legislative procedure
and (2) qualitative text data about each step of the leg‐
islative procedure.
The first component of the dataset contains gen‐
eral information about the legal act (legal basis, title of
the legislative act, inter‐institutional code, CELEX num‐
ber, type of procedure, type of act, directory codes and
subcodes, total duration of the procedure in number of
days, etc.), as well as information about the procedure
in each institution (EP votes, names and party affilia‐
tion of the rapporteurs and of the rapporteurs for opin‐
ion, EP position at 1st reading, 2nd reading, 3rd read‐
ing, dates of the Council’s political agreement, Council
position at 1st reading, 2nd reading, 3rd reading, num‐
ber of points A and B on the agenda of the Council, posi‐
tion of the European Commission on EP amendments at
each reading, etc.). The main source to extract the data
is the European Commission’s website (EUR‐Lex), which
contains all documents printed in the Official Journal of
the EuropeanUnion. Though EUR‐Lex provides the stages
of the legislative procedure, an accurate picture can be
obtained only by corroborating all the available sources.
Thus, data extracted from EUR‐Lex is complemented by
data extracted from the EP Legislative Observatory (OEIL)
and the Council’s Document Register, using the inter‐
institutional code (e.g., 2016/0412/COD) as the common
reference number for all European institutions. Between
1998 and 2017, EU institutions adopted 746 legal acts
and 101 international agreements in JHA. From those
847 normative acts, I removed all non‐binding legal acts
(resolutions, opinions) and other instruments (EU institu‐
tions’ internal regulations, EU action programmes, etc.)
and codification procedures, which are processes of
bringing together a legal act (or several related acts) and
all its amendments into a single new act. I was thus left
with N = 536 procedures. Table 1 in the Supplementary
File 1 offers an overview of the information the
dataset provides about the legislative procedure in JHA
(the dataset and the detailed codebook are available
on a GitLab repository: https://gitlab.com/shoricitza/
afsj‐pol‐lex‐track‐quantitative‐dataset). Table 1 offers
some descriptive statistics about the first component of
the dataset.
The second component of the dataset contains
text data about each step of the legislative proce‐
dure. Text data (PDF/HTML/XML) is also extracted from
EUR‐Lex, OEIL, and the Council’s Document Register.
PDF/HTML/XML files extracted were converted to plain
text and pre‐processed to make them comparable.
The text is structured following the standard legislative
structure (see Supplementary File 2). Several documents,
mostly those related to the informal trilogue negotia‐
tions, are not publicly available. Individual requests for
documents have been submitted to the EP and the
Council. To understand which stages and text of the
legislative procedures to include in the analysis, I con‐
ducted six exploratory interviews with senior officials
from the EP directorate for legislative acts, the EP unit
for reception and referral of official documents, the
Council’s legal service—quality of legislation—legislative
acts/planning, the legal data processing group of the
Council, the Council’s information services and the
Directorate‐General (DG) for European Parliamentary
Research Services. Following these interviews, I included
in the dataset four main types of legislative steps: the
European Commission (amended) proposal, the EP com‐
mittee and plenary reports, the Council’s negotiation
mandate and/or common position, and the final act
signed by the Presidents of the EP and of the Council.
Legal linguists sometimes make substantial changes to
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the legislative procedure in JHA.











Type of procedure Adopted Withdrawn Pending 1 2 3 A B
Assent (APP) 4 1 853,75 2 0
Assent (AVC) 3 211,33 3 0
Consultation 199 23 1 439,26 202 181
Co‐decision 55 6 42 18 1 773,29 63 69
Non legislative 74 20 474,64 16 2
procedure
Ordinary legislative 85 3 22 99 11 687,03 22 56
procedure
Special legislative 5 2 382,8 1 4
procedure
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the act signedby the Presidents of the EP and the Council,
which biases the analysis of the modifications institu‐
tional actors introduce to the legislative proposal and
the political negotiations between the three institutional
actors involved in the legislative process. For this reason,
the final act published in the Official Journal has been
excluded from the analysis. For those procedures where
trilogues took place, I included an additional step repre‐
sented by the four‐column documents of the trilogues
and the COREPER letter confirming agreement.
3. Measuring the Degree of Change the JHA Proposals
Undergo during the Legislative Procedure Using
Text Mining
Past studies have relied on different types of data and
various methodologies to assess the balance of power
between EU institutional actors. Datasets have been
established using the evaluation of experienced practi‐
tioners of EU policies in these institutions (Neuhold &
Dobbels, 2015; Thomson, 2011, 2015) or the quantifica‐
tion of the EP amendments (Kreppel, 2002; Tsebelis et al.,
2001). Different methodological approaches have also
been used to analyse these data, ranging from formal
modelling (Costello & Thomson, 2013; Selck, 2006) to
inferential statistics (König, 2008; Kreppel, 2002). While
these studies shed light on the distribution of power
among the EU institutions, they all bear important empir‐
ical limitations: (1) practitioners may not have the same
understanding of power as academics, (2) parliamentary
amendments do not reflect the informal negotiations
among actors and do not distinguish between formal and
substantive changes, and (3) formal models and trilogue
studies do not capture all the stages of the legislation‐
making process. In addition, they tend to focus only on
one institution, withmost of the studies analysing the EP
(Kreppel, 2002) or the Council (Thomson, 2011, 2015), or
only on certain stages of the legislative procedure, either
the formal or the informal negotiations (for some excep‐
tions see Laloux & Delreux, 2020; Thomson, 2015).
To overcome the empirical limitation of past stud‐
ies, I use a new machine‐learning based approach to
analyse texts. Text mining techniques have the advan‐
tage of capturing both quantitative information, such as
the length of laws in words or the number of amend‐
ments/modifications. But also, the substantive content
of legislation can be analysed, which would otherwise
require extensive human input that is not viable for
large quantities of legislative text. At the same time,
compared to other methodologies, text mining tech‐
niques can be easily replicated and applied in a vari‐
ety of contexts. Recent studies have used text analy‐
sis methods to evaluate the impact of formal institu‐
tional settings on amendment capabilities. For example,
Cross and Hermansson (2017) use minimum edit dis‐
tances to show that there are significantly more success‐
ful amendments to a European Commission proposal
under co‐decision compared to the consultation pro‐
cedure. Gava et al. (2020) use a dissimilarity index to
assess the capacity of the Swiss parliament to amend
bills. Peterson employs vector word embeddings to ana‐
lyse Congressional modification of legislation (Peterson,
2017). Laloux and Delreux (2020) compute the percent‐
age of words that appear at each phase of the legislative
process to trace the origin of EU legislation.
In line with these studies, I rely on text reuse meth‐
ods to assess the degree of change the JHA proposals
undergo at each legislative step and the extent to which
the changes proposed by actors are included in the final
adopted text. The approach of text reuse methods is
based on the idea that similarity between texts can be
assessed by looking at how much text is common to two
versions of the proposal. Accordingly, I compared the
full texts adopted at the different stages of the legisla‐
tive proposal with the final adopted version. The com‐
parisons are done in pairs, two at a time. More precisely,
I compare the proposal of the European Commission
with the final adopted text; I then compare the report
of the EP with the final adopted text etc. I use the
FuzzyWuzzy Package in Python to assess the extent to
which institutional actors modify the text. I calculate
a similarity index between an actor’s position at differ‐
ent times in the legislative process and the final legisla‐
tive output. A detailed presentation of the FuzzyWuzzy
Package is provided in the Supplementary File 1. The sim‐
ilarity index varies between 0 percent and 100 percent,
where 0 means that the text adopted by a specific actor
is totally different from the final adopted text, and 100
indicates that the text is exactly the same as the final
adopted text. The index can be interpreted as the rate
of change between an actor’s position and the final leg‐
islative output and is calculated for each component of
the legislative proposal (preambles, articles, annexes).
To visualise the evolution of JHA legislative proce‐
dures, I developed a web application (https://shoricitza.
gitlab.io/afsjlexpol). For each legislative procedure, the
web application provides a visualisation of the text
adopted at each stage of the legislative procedure (e.g.,
the text proposed by the European Commission, the posi‐
tions of the EP at each reading, trilogues four column
documents, the positions adopted by the Council at each
reading, etc.) and the similarity index between the text
adopted at each step of the legislative procedure and the
final adopted one. All the similarity indexes can be freely
downloaded in .csv format from the web application for
each legislative proposal.
4. Research Questions That Can Be Answered Using
the Dataset
In this section, I discuss some of the research questions
towhich the dataset is relevant, by providing some exam‐
ples, and identify some questions that could be further
developed. The dataset can be used to address the dis‐
crepancy between formal and substantive democratic
governance by examining the link between actors’ formal
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power and their influence on legislative outputs. It does
so by offering a broad understanding of the legislative
procedure, without losing the specificities of the JHA pol‐
icy area.
4.1. Do Actors Make Use of Their Formal Prerogatives
or Not?
At the aggregate level, similar to both formal models and
JHA case studies literature, the dataset suggests a limited
role of the EP in the consultation procedure. On the one
hand, between 1998 and 2017, the EP rejected 15 per‐
cent of the proposals initiated under consultation—most
of them being member states’ initiatives. The Council
completely ignored the opinion of the Parliament and
adopted the texts. Nonetheless, contrary to the conclu‐
sions of the literature on JHA, the EP position in con‐
sultation is not radically different to that of the Council.
As shown in Table 2, the average similarity index between
the final adopted text and the text adopted by the EP is
88.5 percent.
A few exceptions should be mentioned, such as the
Council Directive relating to the conditions inwhich third‐
country nationals shall have the freedom to travel in the
territory of the member states for periods not exceeding
three months (2001/0155/CNS) or the Blue Card direc‐
tive. However, these examples tend rather to be excep‐
tions. The dataset offers the possibility to go beyond a
general overview of the legislative proposal and under‐
stand the influence of actors, article by article, thus offer‐
ing a more nuanced picture of actors’ behaviour. The leg‐
islative proposal on giving temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx of displaced persons offers an
interesting example. On a general level, the positions
of the three actors are rather similar with a similarity
index of 86.63 percent between the proposal of the
European Commission and the final text adopted by the
Council and of 85.82 percent between the text adopted
by Parliament and the final text adopted by the Council.
However, at the individual level of the articles, the pic‐
ture is more nuanced. On the one hand, the EP intro‐
duced several substantive amendments that were com‐
pletely ignored by the Council. For example, it introduced
a new paragraph in article 8 granting persons enjoy‐
ing temporary protection access to their territory and
amended article 13 to better protect the right to family
reunification, neither of which was included in the final
text. As can be seen, the similarity index between the
position of the EP, both at the committee and at the ple‐
nary level, and the final text adopted by the Council, is
only 53 percent, showing a limited influence of the EP
on the final text:
Article 13: Similarity index and article size
sim_ Commission’s proposal: 86%
article_size_ Commission’s proposal: 2833
sim_ EP committee report: 53%
article_size_ EP committee report: 1030
sim_ EP position at 1st reading: 53%
article_size_ EPs position at 1st reading: 1032
article_size_ Adoption by Council: 1045
On the other hand, there are instanceswhere the Council
partially retained the amendments proposed by the EP.
For example, the EP substantially modified article 18,
which affirmed the incompatibility of temporary protec‐
tion with the status of asylum, to offer more guarantees
to asylum seekers. Here, however, the Council partially
included the modifications suggested by the EP in the
final adopted text. The similarity index between the EP
position and the final adopted text is 86 percent:
Article 18: Similarity index and article size
sim_ Commission’s proposal: 59%
article_size_ Commission’s proposal: 472
sim_ EP committee report: 86%
article_size_ EP committee report: 662
sim_ EP’s position at 1st reading: 86%
article_ size_EP’s position at 1st reading: 658
article_size_ Adoption by Council: 363
Table 2. Descriptive statistics consultation procedure (%).
COM proposal EP committee report EP plenary Adoption by the Council
Min 57 57 57 100
Max 100 100 100 100
Average 87.76 87.35 88.58 100
St dev 6.47 6.85 7.04 110
N 248 248 248 248
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4.2. Did the Generalisation of the Co‐Decision Procedure
Result in an Increased Influence of the EP?
When it comes to the co‐decision procedure, the dataset
suggests that the distribution of power between the
three institutional actors is more balanced compared to
the consultation procedure. In this sense, the dataset
tends to support the conclusions of the empirical stud‐
ies on JHA, which argue that the EP favoured compro‐
mise with the Council, even when this went against its
own preferences, and only occasionally used its new pre‐
rogatives to impact on the development of JHA policies
(Lopatin, 2011; Ripoll Servent, 2013; Trauner & Ripoll
Servent, 2015).
Table 3 gives an overview of the co‐decision proce‐
dure before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Table 4 does the same for the time period after the
Lisbon Treaty.
Two preliminary findings can be drawn from the
tables below. First, after the Lisbon Treaty, both the
EP and the European Commission proposed texts that
were not extremely different from the final adopted
text, showing thus a more pragmatic negotiation strat‐
egy. Second, as pointed out by the JHA literature, the
EP tended to compromise more with the Council after
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, compared to
the period before. However, this does not mean that
the influence of the EP is limited, substantive parliamen‐
tary amendments being incorporated in the final text.
The legislative proposal on combating fraud and counter‐
feiting of non‐cashmeans of payment (2017/0226/COD),
which was randomly selected from the dataset, offers a
case in point. The proposal aimed to update the Council
Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA on combating fraud
and counterfeiting of non‐cash means of payment in
order to adapt it to the new challenges and technolog‐
ical developments such as virtual currencies and mobile
payments. In this sense, it sought to establish a frame‐
work to deal effectively with non‐cash payment fraud.
At the aggregate level of the proposal, all three insti‐
tutions entered the legislative procedure with positions
that were rather different compared to the final adopted
act. Though important differences can be noticed on
each article, an agreement on the text was reached only
during the third and last trilogue negotiation.
4.3. How Do Formal Rules and Informal Practices Affect
the Distribution of Power?
The data shows the importance of informal negotiations.
Indeed, neither the Council, nor the EP, nor the European
Commission had a clear determinant role in the final
output in the above‐mentioned example. For example,
while the final adopted article 19 is similar to the posi‐
tion of the Council in the third trilogue, article 20 reflects
rather the position of the EP. The aggregate similarity
indexes confirm the same trend, and the average simi‐
larity index of the EP position passes at 99.71 percent
after trilogue negotiations. By providing information on
all stages of the legislative procedures, the dataset inte‐
grates informal practices into the study of EU legisla‐
tive process. Existing research stressed that the informal‐
isation of the legislative procedure has become partic‐
ularly prominent in co‐decision/ordinary legislative pro‐
cedure (Brandsma, 2019; Reh et al., 2013; Roederer‐
Rynning & Greenwood, 2015). Trilogues have become
the main mechanism for inter‐institutional legislative
negotiations, and they can persistently and systemati‐
cally depart from formal rules (Brandsma, 2019; Farrell
& Héritier, 2003; Kleine, 2013; Reh et al., 2013; Thomson,
2015). However, despite an increased academic interest
in informal practices since their emergence in the early
Table 3. Descriptive statistics co‐decision procedure before Lisbon (%).
EP committee COM EP committee
COM report EP plenary Council amended report EP plenary SIGN
proposal 1st reading 1st reading position proposal 2nd reading 2nd reading EP‐Council
Min 35 30.22 46.53 57.73 45.58 57.73 51.52 100
Max 90.84 94.15 97.65 99.47 92.15 99.61 99.53 100
Average 84.60 85.41 86.93 77.54 74.89 82.26 86.47 100
St dev 13.44 13.11 12 20.83 21.29 19.95 19.05 0
N 61 61 61 19 19 19 19 61
Table 4. Descriptive statistics co‐decision procedure after Lisbon (%).
COM proposal EP committee report EP plenary General approach SIGN EP‐Council
Min 75.48 75.29 99.7 87.70 100
Max 93.93 100 100 96.86 100
Average 92.74 95.81 99.71 94.05 100
St dev 5.08 6.54 1.16 6.3 0
N 110 110 110 110 110
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2000s, with very few exceptions (Laloux & Delreux, 2020;
Thomson, 2015) research into trilogues focused on each
institution, with most of the studies analysing the EP, fail‐
ing to integrate informal practices into the whole EU leg‐
islative decision‐making process. This is mainly due to
the lack of data. Using the dataset, future researchmight
examine to what extent and in which direction actors
modify their position during the informal negotiations.
The data also shows a surprising phenomenon.
Though the Lisbon Treaty increased the formal pow‐
ers of the EP by making it a full co‐legislator in JHA
issues, its role is limited by the spectacular increase in
non‐legislative procedures (NLP) which can be noticed in
this area after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
From 2010 until 2017, 86 NLPs, representing 40 percent
of the adopted JHA acts, have been initiated compared
to only 10 before 2010. Most of those NLPs concern
the negotiation and conclusion of formal agreements
with third countries, measures in the domain of family
law, measures in the field of criminal procedural law not
already foreseen by the Treaty, as well as EU/Schengen
common policy on visas. The Lisbon Treaty massively
strengthened the role of the EP in the external dimension
of the AFSJ, allowing it to ratify international agreements
in internal security with co‐decision or consent being
required for almost all acts. However, in practice the
NLPs initiated between 2010 and 2017 required only con‐
sultation with the EP. Those procedures were adopted
either on the basis of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU; Art 81(3)), such as propos‐
als authorising different EU member states to accept
the accession of third countries to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, or on Art 78(3) TFEU, which provides a spe‐
cific legal basis to deal with emergency situations at the
external borders. This high increase of NLPs proves that
formal rules provide critical openings for agency and
the European Commission choses strategically an institu‐
tional rule that limits the scope of the legislative powers
the EP gained with the extension of the co‐decision to
the JHA.
4.4. Which Factors Explain the Influence of Institutional
Actors on Legislative Outputs?
There is nonetheless scope for further inquiry into the
causes of actors’ success in influencing the final leg‐
islative output. For example, the dataset can be used
to understand how much the EP has a voice and why.
The dataset suggests that formal institutional change
did not have much impact on the capacity of the EP to
influence legislative output. Other variables might be at
play. As such, indicators measuring both actors’ formal
resources (e.g., types of procedure, member states’ vot‐
ing weights in the Council, voting rules in the Council
and the Parliament, legal nature of the acts, etc.) as well
as their informal weight in the decision‐making process
(e.g., technical expertise of the rapporteur, congruence
between the rapporteur and presidency of the Council,
policy expertise of the DGs, etc.) could be used. At the
same time, the potential to influence legislative outputs
might be related to the incentives actors face tomobilise
their power. Those incentives are determined by pol‐
icy attributes (e.g., degree of Europeanisation, technical
complexity of the proposal, salience of the policy for pub‐
lic opinion, degree of conflict/consensus, level of unanim‐
ity in the EP and/or the Council), as well as by the rela‐
tions between actors in the context of the legislative pro‐
posal (share of policy core beliefs).
4.5. Going beyond the Traditional Methodological
Approaches
Lastly, the dataset offers a test case for the relevance
of text reuse methods to study the EU law‐making and
decision‐making processes more broadly. Identifying
substantive differences in the legislative proposals,
beyond that of simply counting the number of words
or amendments, gives us more insights into the nature
of modifications introduced by each institutional actor.
Consider for example the activity of the EP’s commit‐
tee compared to that of the plenary. The basic logic is
that if the final version of the adopted text is similar
to the plenary version and different from the commit‐
tee one, the plenary is influential. In other words, the
fact that an actor makes significant changes to the leg‐
islative proposal may be considered at first sight as evi‐
dence of that actor’s influence on the final legislative
output. However, the fact that the plenary version is
more similar to the final adopted act than the committee
version could mean that the EP modified the proposal
to ensure that the proposal is adopted at first reading.
In co‐decision, most of the time, the text the EP adopts
in the plenary is the text that results from the informal
trilogue negotiations. By analysing the evolution of the
legislative proposal during the legislative process, we can
clearly indicate which actor is responsible for the bulk of
textual modifications of the legislative act and at which
stage (formal or informal). Contrary to formal modelling
which interprets and models the power of institutional
actors mainly based on their formal treaty prerogatives,
text mining offers an accurate empirical measure of the
influence of actors on legislative outputs. At the same
time, contrary to small‐N case studies, which generalise
their conclusions from a very limited number of cases,
textmining techniques allow the study of very large num‐
bers of legislative texts. Moreover, by comparing one
version of the text to another, such methods provide
insights into whether the changes made by one organ
of an institution reverse the modifications introduced by
another organ of the same institution. For example, if
the plenary of the EP reverses the changes introduced by
the committee, or if the COREPER reverses the changes
introduced by the Council’s working groups. Thus, apply‐
ing text mining techniques to EU law‐making provides
an understanding not only on the balance of power
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between the institutions, but also on the distribution
of power between different organs of the same insti‐
tution. There is however scope for further inquiry into
matching the content of actors’ modifications and the
content of the final adopted act. For example, research
on different ASFJ policy areas has shown that contrary
to scholarly expectations, despite the empowerment
of the EP, the rationale of providing ‘security’—in all
its expressions—remains dominant (Trauner & Lavenex,
2015, p. 220). Or as previously mentioned this research
is based on case studies of salient EU proposals, thus it is
still unknown if this conclusion holds true for more ‘rou‐
tinised’ legislation. One way of filling this gap is to use
‘active learning’ which is a supervised learning approach,
to match actors’ substantive modifications with the final
adopted act (Casas et al., 2020). The logic behind ‘active
learning’ is to identify a small number of cases where
the positions of the Parliament, the Council and the
European Commission match the final adopted act and
identify the policy core beliefs (e.g., protection of human
rights vs security, data protection vs data processing, bor‐
der control vs integration, etc.) and then assign these dif‐
ferent dimensions to each paragraph of the legislative
text. A trained classifier can be used to predict the share
of actors’ substantive modifications in the adopted leg‐
islative proposal for the whole text corpus.
Thus, the dataset and the use of text mining tech‐
niques provide a valuable source for scholars inter‐
ested in EU legislative procedures in general, as well as
intra‐institutional negotiations in different policy fields
and the formal and de facto legislative influence of
the European Commission and the EP in particular.
Nonetheless, as with any kind of dataset and method, it
also has limitations.
5. Limitations of the Dataset
In this section I address two main criticisms that can be
directed to the dataset, which are linked to its limitations.
I also draw attention to the problems scholars might face
when working with EU text data.
The first criticism is that the dataset treats EU insti‐
tutions as homogenous actors, leaving no room for
tracing the political games inside each institution and
the internal political dynamics, all of which might have
important consequences for inter‐institutional relations.
Related to this, another criticism is that official docu‐
ments measure only the revealed/strategic preferences
of actors. In response, I first point out that the quali‐
tative dataset offers different proxies for the identifica‐
tion of politicisation inside the institutions. For the EP,
the dataset contains information on the political affilia‐
tion of rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs, the degree
of unanimity in the EP (votes for, against, and absten‐
tions), the number of parliamentary amendments and
the position of the European Commission on each par‐
liamentary amendment. For the Council of Ministers,
the dataset provides the number of items A (propos‐
als for which an agreement has been reached at the
COREPER level) and B (proposals for which no agree‐
ment has been reached or politically sensitive issues)
on the agenda of the Council, which reflect the degree
of consensus/conflict a particular proposal raises (Novak
et al., 2020). The dataset also provides information on
the nature of the legislative proposal. For example, the
controversial/uncontroversial nature of a legislative pro‐
posal can be deduced from the timespan between the
European Commission’s proposal and the EP commit‐
tee report/Council’s position, or the number of readings.
The technical complexity of a policy can be measured by
the number of DGs involved (see Laloux, 2021; Senninger
et al., 2020).
However, the text data does not allow identifica‐
tion of member states’ positions within the Council, nor
the origin of parliamentary compromise amendments.
The reason why I disaggregated this text data is the lack
of systematisation of information provided by the EU
institutions. If the Council’s outcomes of proceedings
provide the position of member states on certain issues
in the footnotes, it does not do so in a systematicmanner.
Sometimes these positions are completely lacking, other
times they are concealed due to the sensitive nature of
the issues discussed. Moreover, as shown by Brandsma
et al. (2021, p. 19), the shift towards bilateral forms of
mandating and the change in Council’s practice in 2014
resulted in no mention of the member states’ positions
in the footnotes. Thus, it becomes impossible to trace
this information using an automated text data extraction.
Tracing the origin of parliamentary compromise amend‐
ments is even more problematic than that of member
states’ positions in the Council. All senior officials of
the EP who were interviewed pointed out the private
nature of the political negotiations and the difficulty of
assessing how much of the amendment has been incor‐
porated into the final compromise amendment. Though
some researchers (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2021) have
tried to estimate the level of incorporation of EP amend‐
ments into the final agreement, their measure is rather
crude. Obviously, this limitation makes the dataset of lit‐
tle relevance for researchers interested in understanding
the ideological battles inside the EU institutions and the
left‐right, pro/anti‐integration or the GAL‐TAN cleavages.
More qualitative methods, susch as interviews with the
relevant actors, can be used to capture those dynamics.
Another criticism is that in co‐decision/ordinary leg‐
islative procedure, the positions of the Council and of the
EP before trilogue negotiations refer to different types
of documents and, therefore, cannot be compared, at
least not in the same way. For example, while for some
legislative proposals, the general approach is retained
as the Council’s position before negotiations, for others
the compromise text of the Presidency or the political
agreement are used. While the compromise text reflects
agreement in the Council Working Parties, the general
approach is the preliminary agreement on the text, as
agreed at ministerial level. The same can be said about
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the EP, where different documents such as committee
draft reports and negotiation mandates, are used.
The first response to this criticism is that the differ‐
ent terminologies used do not necessary reflect different
types of documents. Before January 2012 and the publi‐
cation of the Council note on the Terminology to be used
in Council and COREPER agendas for legislative items
under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (5084/12), the
terms were not used consistently by the different organs
of the Council. As acknowledged by one of the senior offi‐
cials in the Council’s legal service—quality of legislation—
legislative acts/planning, this not only created confu‐
sion, but also had unplanned procedural consequences
as the wrong files were sometimes used during the inter‐
institutional negotiations. To overcome this difficulty, all
files were manually checked to verify that they were
reflecting the agreement of the Council on the legislative
proposal pending the EP vote. After 2012, the Council
made an effort to clarify and systematise the terminol‐
ogy used. In the EP, though the annex XXI of the Code of
Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of the Ordinary
Legislative Procedures of the EP’s Rules of Procedure
adopted in 2009, established some general principles
regarding the preparation of trilogue negotiations, there
was no clear procedure when it came to the document
used by the negotiation team. The mandate could have
been the committee legislative report, or the amend‐
ments adopted in plenary for first‐reading negotiations.
Eventually, this system was reformed in 2012 and the EP
mandate is based either on a report adopted in commit‐
tee or the position adopted in Plenary and clearly identi‐
fied as negotiation mandate (as in Art. 71 of the Rules of
Procedure of the European Parliament). As in the case of
the Council’s position, all parliamentary documents have
been manually checked.
The second response to this criticism regarding com‐
parability of the documents is that the positions are com‐
parable in that they are used by the institutions them‐
selves as negotiation mandates. Independently of the
typology or of the level at which the documents were
adopted (committee vs plenary; working groups vsminis‐
ters), I used the documents as designated by each institu‐
tion as its position before entering the interinstitutional
negotiations. Using this information, it is possible to iden‐
tify patterns of legislative change. For example, in consul‐
tation, the vast majority of parliamentary positions are
very similar to that of the EuropeanCommission (average
similarity index = 95 percent). These results might sug‐
gest that the European Commission and the Parliament
act together as integration‐minded actors in JHA, con‐
trary to member states, which favour a more intergov‐
ernmental approach to JHA.
Lastly, scholars who use automated data collection
and text mining methods to analyse EU text data must
be aware of the poor quality of the data provided by the
EU institutions. First, there are discrepancies between
the data repositories/web services of each institution.
Though each institution provides the legislative proce‐
dure stages, an accurate picture can be obtained only
by corroborating all the available sources. Indeed, data
contained on EUR‐Lex is reliable and complete only for
what concerns the European Commission. The same
is true for the OEIL and for the Council’s document
register. In addition, data provided by the Council is
unstructured, which means that different methods have
to be used to extract the data. I used web scrapping
and corroborated the results with the open data pro‐
vided by the Council. Second, several documents for
the EP and the Council, for the time period 1999–2003
(approx. 150 procedures), correspond in practice to
other procedures than those indicated. For example, for
the proposal 2000/0304(CNS) Fight against Organised
Crime: Financial Support, Programme for the Prevention
(Hippocrates), the link of the EP committee on OEIL
refers to a completely different proposal. Thus, data
should be manually validated to ensure its validity. Third,
text data is not similarly structured for each institution.
For example, while the European Commission provides
the full (amended) text, the EP only provides a list of
amendments for the position adopted at the commit‐
tee level and, sometimes, though not systematically, the
consolidated text for the position adopted by the ple‐
nary. The Council provides the whole text modified using
bold, strikethrough or underlining. Those discrepancies
require important pre‐processing efforts because to be
comparable the text should have the same structure.
6. Conclusion
Despite these different limitations of the dataset and
challenges raised by automatic text analysis of EU data,
the AFSJ‐Pol‐Lex‐Track dataset offers a valuable source of
information for assessing the interplay between actors’
formal power and policy outcomes. In this sense, it
becomes possible to identify and study the law‐making
patterns, dynamics and issueswithin the JHA law‐making
procedure, across time and across policy sub‐fields.
It does so by combining in a single enhanced envi‐
ronment, the ability to gather, analyse and relate dif‐
ferent stages of the law‐making process, the differ‐
ent texts proposed and the negotiations between the
European Commission, the EP and the Council. By indi‐
vidualising the text versions adopted at each legisla‐
tive stage, the visualisation application and the similar‐
ity indexes enable the identification of each institutional
actor involved in the legislative process and of the legisla‐
tivemodifications it introduces to the text: Which part of
the final text originates from the European Commission?
Which part originates from the EP and which from the
Council? Who is at the origin of the modifications that
change the draft legislative proposal substantially?
The similarity indexes offer a more quantitative lon‐
gitudinal measure of the capacity of actors to determine
policy outputs. There is scope for further inquiry into the
nature of modifications introduced during the legislative
process. For this reason, active learning (supervised or
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unsupervised) techniques can be used to match actors’
substantive modifications with the final adopted act and
to identify the policy ideas (e.g., protection of human
rights vs security, data protection vs data processing)
that are incorporated into the final adopted text. Beyond
the JHA policy area, the methods presented in this arti‐
cle to collect data on the EU legislative procedure and
to analyse it can be applied to any EU policy field, thus
providing a new perspective in EU legal and political sci‐
ence studies.
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